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Abstract  
Since the beginning of the political debates in the 1980s, questions of justice have been 
at the core of the quest to find a political solution to global climate change. The 
literature has thus far identified a number of key justice dilemmas, central questions 
and justice principles. However, apart from a few exceptions in the ‘non-ideal theory’ 
strand, the majority of scholars has focused on the philosophical and theoretical level, 
making it difficult to transfer their ideas to the actual political struggles on the ground. 
The aim of this working paper is thus a twofold one. Firstly, it maps and discusses the 
most influential climate justice positions that the literature has developed so far. 
Secondly, it introduces three conceptions of justice, namely non-domination, 
impartiality, and mutual recognition, that are more attuned to the political struggles 
around climate change. The main objective is to discuss how they relate to the existing 
climate justice positions and to sketch out new ways of thinking about climate justice 
that allow us to critically examine the policies and behaviour of key actors in the 
international negotiations on climate change. 
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Introduction 
[…] the global nature of climate change calls for the widest possible cooperation 
by all countries and their participation in an effective and appropriate 
international response, in accordance with their common but differentiated 
responsibilities and respective capabilities and their social and economic 
conditions […].  
(UN 1992: 2) 
As the first part of the above quote from the 1992 adopted United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) indicates, already at that time most actors 
acknowledged the magnitude of the problem and the necessity to quickly come to an 
effective and encompassing solution. In the following years, scientific evidence soon 
suggested that in order to ‘prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the 
climate system’ (UN 1992: 9), global warming would have to be limited to a maximum 
of two degrees relative to pre-industrial levels (IPCC 1995). To reach this goal, all states 
would have to curb their emissions substantively in the coming years. Subsequently, 
this lead to the yearly Conferences of the Parties (COP) within the UNFCCC since 1995 
and eventually to various international regimes to curb climate change with the Kyoto 
Protocol and the latest Paris Agreement standing out in particular.  
Thus, there seems to be an overwhelming scientific and political consensus on the 
diagnosis of the problem, and we have witnessed considerable efforts of countless 
scientists, politicians and activists (Christian Aid 2006; CNA 2007; WBGU 2008; 
World Bank et al. 2014; IPCC 2015) to foster proper countermeasures. However, the 
political measures implemented so far have not been able to significantly reduce 
anthropogenic emissions and hence have largely failed to tackle the problem in an 
appropriate manner. While the UNFCCC, the Kyoto protocol and the latest Paris 
agreement are certainly steps into the right direction (Dröge 2016; UN 2015), they only 
constitute a drop in the ocean in the face of the magnitude of the challenge. Eventually, 
they might be only a form of symbolic politics with little concrete effect on the earth’s 
atmosphere and the suffering of present and future generations (Gardiner 2004b: 39). 
This begs the question, why it is so difficult to reach a global and effective agreement, 
despite the overwhelming evidence that failing to do so would entail catastrophic 
consequences.  
There are of course a number of reasons that have contributed to this problem. Examples 
are economic considerations, domestic political struggles, path dependencies, uneven 
power relations, failed or misguided processes of securitisation, the structural 
characteristics of climate change, and the associated political regimes (Fletcher 2009; 
Springer 2008; Rosenberg et al. 2010; Falkner 2013; Diez et al. 2016; Keohane and Victor 
2011; Mitchell 2006; Underdal 2002; Harris 2007). However, despite the relevance of all 
these factors, it is particularly the unprecedented and complex ethical dilemmas of climate 
change that arguably constitute the most fundamental aspect. They underlie most of the 
above issues and make it so difficult to define what climate change means politically and to 
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find a global, robust and fair solution to the problem (Okereke and Coventry 2016; Posner 
and Weisbach 2010: 4; Gardiner 2004a). Thus, a number of scholars from different 
disciplines such as philosophy, normative and political theory, law, and also international 
relations, have discussed questions of environmental and climate justice (Sachs 2014; Shue 
1993, 1999; Gardiner 2004a, 2006; Caney 2005, 2010a; Harris 2003; Jamieson 1996; 
Meyer and Roser 2013; Vanderheiden 2008; Zellentin 2015a, 2015b, 2015c). While I am 
not able to deliver a comprehensive overview of the entire debate (for an overview see for 
instance Arnold 2011; Moellendorf 2015), it is possible to single out at least three core 
dimensions of the climate justice debate.  
The first dimension is about the conflict of goals between distributional and 
intergenerational justice that lies at the very core of all climate justice debates (Sachs 
2014; Okereke and Coventry 2016; Gardiner 2004a; Page 1999; Meyer and Roser 
2013). While it would be in the interest of all states to mitigate immediately to prevent 
serious harm to future generations, differences in the states contributions to the 
problem, their affectedness, but also their capabilities and interests to further grow 
economically, have so far prevented decisive action and have opened serious rifts 
between developed and developing countries.   
The second dimension does not exclusively pertain to climate justice issues but has 
sparked fierce discussions in this field. It relates to broader questions about the most 
appropriate ethical approaches to tackle the above described justice dilemmas. It 
includes debates between those relying on teleological or consequentialist approaches 
(Posner and Weisbach 2010) and those that favour non-teleological or deontological 
ones (Caney 2010a; Sachs 2014; Zellentin 2015c: 129). Beyond that, particularly in 
recent years several scholars have discussed to what extent ‘ideal’ or ‘non-ideal theory’ 
should form the basis for thinking about climate justice (Zellentin 2015c: 124; Heyward 
and Roser 2016; Caney 2016b; Gajevic Sayegh 2016).  
The last dimension entails key questions concerning the practical implications of the 
above-described justice dilemmas. Most importantly; how to allocate emission 
entitlements as well as the associated costs for mitigation, adaptation and 
compensation measures. In this vein, it also pertains to concrete principles of climate 
justice, such as the polluter pays or the ability to pay principle, which the literature has 
come up with to date (Page 1999; Caney 2010a; Gardiner 2004a; Page 2013; 
Moellendorf 2015).  
While it is thought provoking and necessary to approach these aspects of climate justice in 
an abstract and theoretical sense, it can be difficult to transfer the insights to the actual 
political struggles (Zellentin 2015c: 122) and to make use of them to find ways of achieving 
climate justice politically. Thus, from an IR perspective there are a number of aspects that 
the current climate justice literature has so far neglected, but which nevertheless play an 
important role in preventing or enabling climate justice. It hence seems to be in order to 
bring some justice conceptions into the debate that are closer to the actual political 
negotiations about climate change and that enable us to better understand the enabling and 
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constraining factors for global climate justice. In the literature, three core conceptions of 
justice have received particular attention (Eriksen 2016). Firstly, justice as non-domination, 
which largely focuses on states as the main actors and tries to sketch out pathways to 
overcome the uneven power relations at the international level (Pettit 2010, 1997; Lovett 
2009; Shapiro 2012; Bachvarova 2013; Markell 2008). Secondly, justice as impartiality, 
emphasising the need for neutral and unbiased approaches to global justice problems and 
taking into account the needs of states and individuals (Eriksen 2016: 13–18; Kant and Reiss 
1991; Føllesdal 2000; Kane 1996). Finally, justice as mutual recognition, largely focusing on 
societal groups and on achieving a contextualised understanding of the multitude of 
perspectives and on processes that allow these to be heard and included (Eriksen 2016: 18-
22; Schmidt 2007; Anderson and Honneth 2005).  
The aim of this paper is thus to discuss how these three conceptions relate to the 
existing climate justice literature and how a re-reading of key climate justice problems 
but also of core issues in the political debates through these conceptions might lead to 
new insights and to pathways of actually furthering climate justice politically and not 
just philosophically. In the remainder of this working paper, I first discuss how the 
literature has so far discussed questions of climate justice with an emphasis on the 
already introduced key justice dilemmas and practical questions of allocation. 
Thereafter, I introduce the three conceptions of justice and discuss how they can help 
us in understanding the political struggles about climate justice.  
Mapping climate justice positions  
Before I start to discuss the key questions of climate justice, a brief look at the scientific 
basis of climate change and two central issues is necessary. 
The role of uncertainty and the maximum carrying 
capacity of the atmosphere 
The first issue concerns scientific uncertainty. Due to the complex nature of climate 
change involving the calculation of countless variables and the prediction of the future 
behaviour of the entire global ecosystem, climate models have always contained a 
considerable degree of uncertainty (Gardiner 2004a: 564; Moellendorf 2015: 181; 
Zellentin 2015c: 123). However, since the establishment of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in 1988, the knowledge on climate change has greatly 
improved. This means that although the IPCC still does not make deterministic 
predictions and instead operates with risk assessments and probabilities concerning 
climate change, this is not the same as uncertainty.  
There are many different understandings of the concept of risk which I cannot discuss 
here in any depth (Aradau and van Munster 2007; Clapton 2011; Kessler 2012), yet, 
climate science largely has operated with traditional risk assessments. These are 
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typically based on (perceived) robust knowledge about a phenomenon, which allows 
making justified assessments concerning the probability of certain events and hence to 
manage ‘the incalculable’ (Beck 2002: 41). By contrast, uncertainty – at least in a 
technical sense –, or non-traditional, non-linear risks mean the impossibility to give 
any reasonable probability figures (Gardiner 2004a: 564; Kessler 2012: 22–23). If 
understood in this sense, the only real uncertainty left in climate science concerns the 
specific regional impact, the exact magnitude and the timing of climate change and not 
whether the phenomenon is happening or manmade (Gardiner 2004a: 564). 
Nevertheless, several climate sceptical actors have tried to use the cautious, non-
deterministic scientific language and the remaining degree of uncertainty concerning 
specific aspects to spread doubt about the necessity to act on climate change (Harris 
2001: 20). While this position has received some support in the political debates, 
particularly in the US (McCright and Dunlap 2011), from a climate justice point of view 
it is invalid (Moellendorf 2015: 181).  
The IPCC keeps operating with risk assessments and margins of probability. For 
instance it provides either qualitative levels of confidence that range from ‘very low’ to 
‘very high’ or quantified likelihoods ranging from ‘exceptionally unlikely’ to ‘virtually 
certain’ (IPCC 2015: 2). In this vein, the 2015 IPCC report makes it clear beyond any 
doubt that the basic science behind the phenomenon is well understood, that climate 
change is happening and that there is a 95 per cent certainty that humans are the 
driving force behind it (IPCC 2015: v, 2-3). The only noticeable uncertainty in relation 
to climate change – i.e. the IPCC has not given any concrete probability figures – 
concerns specific phenomena such as the role of ice sheet collapse or the release of 
methane from the arctic tundra (Moellendorf 2015: 181). Yet, even if the exact impact 
of these variables is not yet fully understood, the uncertainty points in either direction. 
Thus, while some of these phenomena could slow down global warming there are others 
that could greatly accelerate it (Gardiner 2004a: 569).  
Thus, from a justice point of view it seems unreasonable to deduce a justification for 
inaction only because one can never be 100 per cent certain (Moellendorf 2015: 182). 
In fact it is fairly common to make political decisions under the condition of some 
degree of uncertainty at least if the causal mechanism of a phenomenon are well 
understood (Gardiner 2004a: 565, 567). Just think of the regulation of possibly 
harmful substances in food processing or medications or the widespread adoption of 
the ‘precautionary principle’ for various potentially dangerous issues (Mederake and 
Duwe 2014: 11; Schreurs 2002: 4; Gardiner 2004a: 576). In fact, climate change 
constitutes one of the prime examples where precautionary action seems to be justified 
(Moellendorf 2015: 181–182; Gardiner 2004a: 565, 576).  
The second relevant scientific issue is the carrying capacity of the earth’s atmosphere, 
hence the question where we should draw the line above which the amount of GHGs 
and of global warming is not ‘save’ anymore. Due to the complex nature of climate 
change, this question cannot and has not been answered in a purely scientific way but 
from the beginning has entailed a political element. Thus, the IPCC – which by design 
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merges scientific debates with political influence – and the majority of climate 
scientists have determined that no more than 2000 billion tonnes of CO2 equivalent 
should be emitted globally between 2000-2050 to prevent ‘dangerous interference’ 
with the atmosphere. This figure roughly corresponds to the famous goal to limit global 
warming to two degree goal above pre-industrial levels (Page 2013: 233; IPCC 2015: 
62). Since it is impossible to ascertain any objective save margin and for want of better 
alternatives, most climate justice scholars have adopted this goal as the minimum 
requirement for climate justice and I will follow their lead in this paper. 
Distributive and intergenerational justice: a conflict of 
goals? 
Let us now turn to the more central issues of the climate justice debate and to the first 
dimension, namely the conflict of goals between distributive and intergenerational 
justice.  
Distributive justice 
Since the very beginning of the debates on climate change, questions of distributive 
justice – sometimes also subsumed under corrective justice (Posner et al. 2008: 1570; 
Zellentin 2015b) – have played a crucial role. They particularly pertain to the 
relationship between the rich and the poor as well as between developed and 
developing countries (Sachs 2014; Okereke and Coventry 2016; Caney 2005: 749). The 
ethical issue stems from the above-discussed scientific hypothesis, that the earth’s 
atmosphere can only absorb a certain amount of GHGs before it gets dangerous for all 
and, unfortunately, emissions from individuals or collectives do not stay in the region 
where they have been emitted. The atmosphere hence constitutes a common resource, 
or sink which every individual or collective can or should only use to a certain extent 
(Page 2013: 233; Blomfield 2013, 2016).  
The core problem lies in the fact that different people and states have contributed 
differently to global emissions, thereby also having benefited unequally from burning 
fossil fuels and at the same time are disproportionally affected by the harmful effects of 
climate change (Gardiner 2004b: 39). The developed countries owe much of their 
economic wellbeing and standard of living to the burning of fossil fuels in the past 
(Okereke and Coventry 2016: 2, 3). Hence, it seems reasonable that they should also be 
held responsible for cleaning up their mess and above that also possess the economic 
and technological means to do so (Caney 2010a: 205, 2005: 752; Shue 1993, 1999: 534; 
Gardiner 2004a: 579). Developing countries on the other hand have so far emitted 
much less GHGs into the atmosphere and have less resources to abate climate change 
(Gardiner 2004a: 584–585). Since the amount of GHG emissions has historically been 
closely related to economic growth some have hence proclaimed that developing 
countries should be granted a ‘right to develop’ (Moellendorf 2015: 178) or the right to 
subsistence emissions as opposed to ‘luxury emissions’ of industrialised countries 
(Shue 1993; Gardiner 2004a: 585). Unfortunately, the most dire consequences of 
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climate change such as extreme weather events, desertification and the spread of 
diseases, will materialise not only in developed countries, but on a global scale. To make 
matters worse, due to geographical factors and a much lower political, economic and 
technological coping capacity, the implications of climate change will particularly affect 
the poorest inhabitants of developing countries (WBGU 2007: 2–3; Moellendorf 2015: 
180; Frisch 2012: 227; Zellentin 2015c: 126).  
The manifold distributional justice issues that arise from this constellation have played 
a major role in the literature on climate justice but also in the political negotiations 
where they have been integrated into the UNFCCC (UN 1992: 2) and the Kyoto protocol 
(UN 1998: 9), primarily under the heading of the ‘common but differentiated 
responsibility’ (CBDR) (Vanderheiden 2014). In the course of the negotiations, this 
rather vague principle has led to a distinction between countries that are supposed to 
take climate abatement measures immediately and those that are exempt from any 
definitive duties for the time being. This became most apparent in the distinction 
between ‘Annex I’ (developed) and ‘Non-Annex I’ (developing) countries in the Kyoto 
protocol. This dichotomy has led to several problems. On the one hand, the clear-cut 
distinction reinforces the already existing rift between developed and developing 
countries. The former are supposed to act but have less incentives to do so because they 
are not as much affected by climate change and the latter have a strong interest in the 
developed countries to act but themselves want to catch up economically (Sachs 2014: 
210). On the other hand, it is problematic with a view into the future, in which the 
developed world ceases to be the biggest GHG emitter and instead large developing 
countries such as China and India will fill their place. Thus, recent climate justice 
discussions have criticised the dichotomy, and the international negotiations as well 
have seen new alliances that increasingly water down the clear-cut separation of the 
two camps (Deleuil 2012: 272; Pauw et al. 2014).  
From a theoretical perspective, the distributive justice aspect of climate change has 
often been subsumed as classical ‘tragedy of the commons’ problem, ‘prisoner’s 
dilemma’ or ‘collective action problem’ (Hardin 1968; Paavola 2015) because everyone 
would be better off if all mitigated, yet individually countries could be tempted to free 
ride (Ostrom 1990; Kallhoff 2015; Gardiner 2004b: 28). While this is certainly a viable 
description of the problem, there has been criticism of classical game theoretical 
approaches, and Stephen Gardiner, for instance, has pointed out that in practice it is 
an even more complex game that involves past, present, and future generations 
(Gardiner 2004b: 25, 29-30). 
Intergenerational justice 
Thus, questions of intergenerational justice or historical responsibility constitute 
another key issue of the climate justice debates (Page 1999; Gardiner 2004b: 29, 2006; 
Caney 2005: 749; Meyer and Roser 2013; Schüssler 2011) and also feature prominently 
in the political debates’ most relevant documents (UN 1992: 4, 6; IPCC 2015: vii, 95). 
They stem from the fact that humans have emitted GHGs gradually into the atmosphere 
and that these emissions tend to stay there over a long time (Moellendorf 2015: 174). 
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Moreover, it takes a considerable amount of time until enough solar energy is trapped 
in the earth’s atmosphere to lead to a noticeable warming effect. Thus, the harmful 
effects of climate change do not materialise immediately, but there is a long delay 
between the cause and the effect that often spans beyond the human life expectancy 
(Gardiner 2004b: 29). This leads to the problem that while past and present 
generations have benefitted from burning fossil fuels and emitting GHGs (Caney 2005: 
750; Gardiner 2004b: 30), future generations will have to bear the majority of the costs 
in terms of economic damage and human suffering (Caney 2005: 749; Moellendorf 
2015: 174). At the same time, present generations would have to shoulder most of the 
immediate costs if they wanted to mitigate (and partly adapt to) climate change while 
the benefits of these actions will mostly be enjoyed by future generations (Gardiner 
2004b: 30; Moellendorf 2015: 174; Caney 2005: 749).  
Unfortunately, questions of distributive climate justice and the intergenerational 
responsibilities that arise due to the inertia of the climate system often stand in stark 
opposition to each other. Moreover, questions of climate policy and justice are almost 
always linked to a range of other socio-economic problems such as economic growth, 
poverty reduction, or food security and hence cannot be treated in isolation (Caney 
2016b: 15). Solving the intergenerational justice problem, for instance by halting all 
GHG emissions, would mean to curtail economic development at least to a certain 
extent, thereby making it more difficult especially for poor people and developing 
countries to catch up with developed nations and to reduce poverty (Moellendorf 2015: 
177–178). This apparent conflict of goals has been one of the major problems in the 
international climate negotiations from the beginning and has contributed to the 
described dichotomy between wealthy and powerful developed states and poorer and 
often politically disadvantaged developing nations. The former have repeatedly pointed 
to the intergenerational problem and the vulnerability of future generations and hence 
demanded that all states would have to curtail their emissions (Okereke and Coventry 
2016: 4). The latter have often insisted on a ‘right to development’ and an exclusion of 
developing countries from mitigation duties to overcome the, from their perspective, 
much more pressing distributive injustice in the present (Okereke and Coventry 2016: 3). I 
will explore these tensions in more detail in the section on the practical implications of 
the broader justice issues.  
What kind of Ethics? 
The second dimension of the climate justice debates is about broader philosophical 
debates concerning what kind of ethics is preferable. It touches upon the debates 
between proponents of a consequentialist or teleological reasoning (Posner and 
Weisbach 2010; Posner et al. 2008; Frisch 2012) and those that favour deontological 
approaches (Caney 2010a; Sachs 2014: 209; Page 2013: 241), but it also concerns more 
recent works on ‘non-ideal theory’ (Zellentin 2015c; Heyward and Roser 2016; Caney 
2016b; Gajevic Sayegh 2016). 
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Consequentialism versus deontological ethics 
There are of course many different approaches within the consequentialist strand, 
which I cannot discuss here in any detail (Ikeme 2003: 196; Schüssler 2011: 266–267; 
Jamieson 2013). One of the most popular arguments of the consequentialists, most 
vigorously defended by Eric Posner and David Weisbach, is that redistribution of 
wealth through climate agreements is not the most effective way to help the world’s 
poor. This is why they argue that redistribution and climate policy should be kept 
separate (Sachs 2014: 208, 210, 213; Posner and Weisbach 2010: 73, 2010: 4). Instead, 
we should focus on welfarist principles such as ‘international paretianism’ (Posner et 
al. 2008: 1570) that from their view are both just and feasible and eventually lead to 
better outcomes for all because they maximise global welfare (Posner and Weisbach 
2010: 5).  
Others, such as Simon Caney, Henry Shue or Benjamin Sachs, have argued against this 
view (Caney 2005; Sachs 2014; Shue 1999). They claim for instance that following such 
a teleological reasoning we cannot even make a compelling argument to abate climate 
change at all (Sachs 2014: 209, 219). Moreover, they criticise the understanding of 
redistribution within many prominent teleological approaches as too narrow and often 
conflated with questions of distributive justice (Sachs 2014: 213, 214). The main idea 
of their reasoning is that not abating climate change is morally wrong because it clearly 
‘creates a threat to the life, health and well-being of future people’ (Sachs 2014: 220). At the 
same token, a climate treaty that would threaten present people, such as the poor in 
developing countries, is equally wrong (Sachs 2014: 220). Thus, according to these 
scholars we should reject all teleological approaches and instead focus on non-
teleological principles that while requiring developed nations to shoulder most of the 
immediate costs, also gradually enlist growing developing countries after their 
inhabitants have had a chance to catch up (Shue 1999; Caney 2010b).  
Climate justice in a non-ideal environment 
Beyond that, more recent works (Gajevic Sayegh 2016; Heyward and Roser 2016; 
Caney 2016b; Zellentin 2015c) have looked at the question whether ideal theoretical 
designs are appropriate in the case of climate change, given the less than ideal 
circumstances in which they would have to be implemented. The literature 
distinguishes ideal versus non-ideal theory (Rawls 2003: 8, 216) based on several 
criteria such as fact-sensitiveness, the level of compliance, the degree of perfection of 
justice principles, and its specificity (Gajevic Sayegh 2016: 3–4). In the case of climate 
change, the assumptions of non-ideal circumstances and non-ideal theories of justice 
have particularly focused on two issues. Firstly, non-compliance with climate 
abatement duties and secondly institutional design (Zellentin 2015c: 124–125). 
Concerning the first issue the central question is what actors should do if others do not 
fulfil their responsibilities in abating climate change. Should they compensate by doing 
more than they originally where required to do, if so what exactly, or are they in this 
case relived from their duties as well? (Caney 2016b: 10–11). Regarding the second 
issue, many authors have diagnosed a continuous failure of the international 
negotiations but also of the domestic political systems of many states to bring about 
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effective policies to curb climate change. This has led to questions about the adequacy 
of existing democratic structures (Zellentin 2015c: 125) and the call for entirely new 
political institutions and governance structures (Caney 2016b: 11, 2016a).  
All these debates about what kind of ethics we need in the face of accelerating climate 
change are extremely relevant for my above stated aim to inquire into the political 
relevance of abstract climate justice principles. The last point made by Caney about the 
non-ideal circumstances of the political environment and the question whether we 
need entirely new ways of climate governance is of particular interest. It directly 
touches upon the question raised by Eriksen and others (Eriksen 2016) whether we 
should first of all try to change the rules of the game that have led to global injustice, 
instead of focusing on substantive forms of climate justice. While I cannot discuss these 
ethical questions in more depth in this paper, their practical relevance will become clear 
when looking at the actual consequences for the key political questions of climate 
change. Thus, in the following third dimension of the climate justice literature, I will 
briefly discuss the two most relevant questions, namely how we can fairly allocate 
emission entitlements and who should be held responsible for shouldering the costs for 
mitigation, adaptation and compensation measures? In this vein, I also elaborate on 
the most prominent principles of climate justice, which the literature has developed so 
far.  
Allocation of emission entitlements  
Finding a fair way to allocate emission entitlements first requires us to determine the 
major GHG emitters of the past and present. Here, we immediately touch on the 
intergenerational justice aspect and on questions of historical responsibility (Meyer 
2011; Meyer and Roser 2013; Zellentin 2015b). 
Allocation of past emissions or historic responsibilities 
On the one hand, the emissions of past generations are responsible for current climate 
change and on the other hand, its todays mitigation measures that are vital to preserve the 
future climate (Gardiner 2004b: 30). The tricky part is that emission of GHGs and the 
warming of the planet did not just start when humans first discovered this phenomenon 
and began to discuss its political implications in the late 1980s. Instead, the anthropogenic 
influence on the global climate has been a substantial factor at least since the 
industrialisation began in Europe in the 18th century (Page 2013: 240; IPCC 2015: 4). Thus, 
some of the damage is already done, because there is a large share of historical GHGs or 
past emissions already in the atmosphere that cannot be taken out – at least not in an 
efficient way with existing technology – and which therefore have to be allocated to 
someone (Schüssler 2011; Meyer and Roser 2013).  
One way to account for this historical climate debt, which at first sight seems to be the 
most straightforward one, is to start out from an individualistic viewpoint looking for 
the specific individuals that have emitted most GHGs. This, however, poses an 
immediate practical problem because many of the past emitters are already dead and 
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cannot be held accountable anymore. One could of course argue that the descendants 
of the past GHG emitters should be held responsible (Caney 2005: 756; Shue 1999; 
Neumayer 2000). However, that also entails practical problems because it would be 
nearly impossible to directly trace emissions to specific individuals in the past and to 
their descendants today (Caney 2005: 753). Moreover, it seems unfair to let specific 
descendants take all the blame because they have no way to stop the past emissions of 
their ancestors short of inventing a time machine.  
Still, some scholars such as Henry Shue or Eric Neumayer have opted for this 
individualistic approach. They argue that present individuals should be held 
accountable for their ancestors’ emissions because they have greatly benefited from 
these past emissions that have driven industrialisation and hence created their high 
standard of living in the present (Shue 1999: 533–537; Neumayer 2000). Yet, there are 
also various objections to this argumentation, often based on what Derek Parfit has 
described as ‘non-identity problem’ (Parfit 1986; Page 1999: 56; Caney 2005: 757). In 
a nutshell, this means that the specific individuals living today in a world where 
industrialisation and hence GHG emissions have already happened are not the same 
that would have been born without it because their ancestors would never have mated 
(Page 1999: 56). Hence, one cannot say that the standard of living of present individuals 
has been improved by industrialisation because they would not exist without it (Caney 
2005: 758).  
While some scholars keep arguing for an individualistic perspective despite its 
problems (Caney 2005: 760, 765), many have instead prescribed to a collectivist view 
to overcome the non-identity problem (Page 1999: 61). They focus not on individuals, 
but on collective actors, such as corporations, communities, or nation-states that have 
a longer live span than individuals and hence mostly are still around to be held 
accountable (Page 1999: 66; Caney 2005: 758–759; Page 2013: 232). Out of the 
different forms of collectives, many scholars as well as the political negotiations have 
focused on states (Page 2013: 232). Besides their comparably long lifespan, looking at 
states instead of individuals or corporations has the advantage that they – at least most 
of them – possess the economic, organisational and political means to legitimately 
enforce a just solution for climate change. Thus, from an IR point of view and in order 
to study climate policy, the statist perspective makes sense. 
From this statist viewpoint, looking at the historical records, it becomes fairly obvious 
that it were mostly countries from the Global North i.e. developed or industrialised 
countries that have emitted the major amount of GHGs until now, although large 
emerging economies such as China or India are catching up quickly concerning current 
and historic emissions (Olivier et al. 2015: 4). About 25 per cent of historic emissions 
between 1850 and 2011 can be attributed to the United States and the countries of the 
European Union respectively, followed by China (11 per cent), Russia (8 per cent) and 
Japan (4 percent). Taken together this accounts for two thirds of the world’s historic 
CO2 emissions (Ge et al. 2014). Thus, despite the fact that some past major GHG 
emitting states might not exist anymore or at least not in the same geographical 
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expansion (Page 2013: 238), this approach still makes it possible to identify a large 
group of actors mostly responsible for past emissions.  
However, the literature again raises some objections to this reasoning (Schüssler 2011). 
The most important one is about ‘excusable ignorance’ (Caney 2010a: 208; Page 2013: 
238; Zellentin 2015b). Before the 1980s, people or governments did not know that GHG 
emissions caused climate change, hence one could question whether it would be fair to 
now hold them responsible for the emissions before that time (Caney 2005: 761, 2010a: 
208). However, this objection does not hold due to several related points. Firstly, 
excusable ignorance can only be claimed for some part of the emissions, because from 
the late 1980s on climate change was well understood so states knew what they were 
doing and they kept emitting anyway (Singer 2002: 34; Shue 1999: 536; Neumayer 
2000: 188). Secondly, since there is no way of undoing past emissions, they have to be 
allocated to someone to come to a just solution to the problem. Ignoring past emissions 
would effectively allocate them to all states equally, which does not seem fair either 
(Caney 2005: 762). Moreover, even though industrialised states did not know about the 
harmful consequences of their emissions, they have greatly benefited from them, 
though without being excused due to the non-identity problem (Caney 2005: 759; Shue 
1999: 535–536). At the same time, developing countries already suffer and will keep 
suffering disproportionally in the future due to these emissions, for which they are not 
responsible.  
In conclusion, the literature largely agrees that past emissions matter (Gardiner 2004a: 
579) and that mainly industrialised countries should be held responsible for them 
(Blomfield 2013, 2016). This would justify exempting developing nations from 
immediate mitigation efforts for the time being (Page 2013: 234; Garnaut 2011: 42–45). 
Allocation of future emissions  
This brings us directly to the next issue, namely the allocation of future emission 
entitlements. One way to deal with these future emissions is subsumed under the 
heading of ‘grandfathering’, meaning that every state would have to reduce its 
emissions by a certain percentage based on a emission baseline, often the year 1990 
(Page 2013: 233; Moellendorf 2015: 177). After what we have already discussed above, 
this principle seems unfair because it largely ignores past emissions and would grand 
the past emitters and current high-emitters a larger share of future emissions and 
hence uphold the unfair advantage of these states vis-à-vis low-emitting developing 
countries (Page 2013: 233).  
Thus, another way to distribute future emission rights would be an allocation on a per 
capita basis (Moellendorf 2015: 178), often labelled as ‘emission egalitarianism’ (Page 
2013: 234). This principle seems to be better defendable because despite some 
developing countries catching up concerning their total country emissions, their per 
capita rate is still well below that of developed countries. The per capita principle has 
been for instance proposed by Shue (Shue 2010). It practically means that the total 
amount of carbon that climate scientists have determined as maximum carrying 
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capacity of the atmosphere to keep the global temperature below the two degrees (about 
one trillion tons of carbon, World Resources Institute (WRI) n.d.) would be divided equally 
amongst the inhabitants of developed and developing states. Because people living in 
developed states have already used much or even too much of their fair per capita share, 
this principle would effectively entail a huge redistribution process. It would give developing 
countries some time to catch up before all global per capita emissions would have to 
converge on an equally low level in the future (Garnaut 2011: 42–45; Page 2013: 235). 
While intuitively legitimate, the per capita emission allocation idea has also attracted a 
range of criticisms. Many critics, often based on a teleological or consequentialist 
reasoning, for instance focus on the practicability and highlight that due to the 
considerable redistributive effects such a per capita principle would never stand a 
chance of being accepted by developed countries (Posner and Weisbach 2010). Others, 
including Caney and Gardiner, criticise it as a fetishism of emissions that does not take 
into account basic human needs that might require an even larger emission budget, 
especially in the Global South (Moellendorf 2015: 178; Caney 2011; Gardiner 2004a). 
This has led to a range of further proposals, that all target the already discussed trade-
off between an effective solution to curb GHG emissions, and to establish 
intergenerational justice on the one hand, and a focus on distributive justice aspects in 
the present between the developed and developing world on the other hand. Some have 
thus argued for a ‘right to (sustainable) development’ (Vanderheiden 2008: 64; 
Moellendorf 2015: 178) or an ‘antipoverty principle’ (Moellendorf 2015: 177), which 
have to be taken into account when looking for a just solution to the emission allocation 
problem. By the same token, Shue has made the distinction between ‘subsistence’ and 
‘luxury’ emissions and has argued that while the former have to be granted, the latter 
could be prohibited (Shue 1993). This approach has also been labelled as ‘basic needs’ 
(Vanderheiden 2008: 64) approach or ‘emissions sufficientarianism’ (Page 2013: 235).  
While these approaches circumvent some problems of the per capita principle, there 
remain further problems. To operationalise such a principle, it would be necessary to 
clearly ascertain, where basic needs or subsistence emissions end, and luxury emissions 
begin (Page 2013: 236; Gardiner 2004a: 585). Moreover, emission rights are not the 
only factor in shaping the lives of people, so granting subsistence emissions could still 
mean that many other circumstances that prevent a decent life remain unaddressed 
(Page 2013: 236). Nevertheless, emissions sufficientarianism and the right to 
(sustainable) development keep playing a central role in the climate justice debate and 
most scholars share the consensus that they have to be addressed in some way or 
another in any climate agreement. 
Finding concrete principles or the allocation of costs  
While allocating emissions entitlements in a just way is an important part of climate 
justice, it is only one side of the coin, and does not make a lot of sense without 
discussing concrete ways of dealing with the associated costs of abating climate change.  
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For some time, scholars such as Bjorn Lomborg (2001) and William Nordhaus (2008), 
and several politicians, have argued that due to the high costs, mitigation measures 
would bring about for present generations and hence also for poor people, we should 
instead let climate change happen and merely focus on adapting to it (Gardiner 2004a: 
570, 573). However, at least since Nicolas Stern published its famous report in 2006 
(Stern 2006), this view has increasingly lost its appeal. Stern and others have argued 
that the benefits of decisive early mitigation measures outweigh the costs because 
without decisive mitigation in the present and near future, the future costs for 
adaptation or compensation measures could become unbearably high (Stern 2006: 1, 3; 
Posner and Weisbach 2010: 20, 40). The report estimates that the costs for mitigation 
will be around one per cent of the global GDP by 2050, which seems quite manageable 
(Stern 2006: 12). Beyond that, and leaving aside Sterns primarily economic way of 
putting the argument, without mitigation, climate change will lead to countless 
irretrievable damage. Examples are widespread human suffering, the extinction of 
whole nations (e.g. the small island states) and precious ecosystems as well as the loss 
of cultural heritage around the globe, which all cannot be adequately compensated for 
(Page 1999: 62–63; Zellentin 2015a; Ikeme 2003). Thus, there is a broad consensus in 
the justice literature that coping with climate change has to primarily focus on 
mitigation, even though adaptation and compensation measures will eventually also be 
necessary due to the already happening damage (Caney 2010a: 205, 2016b: 19).  
The polluter pays principle 
The most frequently invoked principle to allocate the costs of abating climate change, 
which on first sight also appears the most straightforward one is the ‘polluter pays 
principle’ (PPP) or ‘contribution to the problem principle’ (Caney 2005: 752; Page 
2013: 237). Leaving aside the ‘micro-versions’ of the PPP that look at individuals 
(Caney 2005: 753), the macro-version of the PPP holds that the states that have brought 
about the mess should also clean up after themselves and hence pay for abatement 
measures (Caney 2005: 754). In practice it would mean that: ‘states should bear the 
costs of managing climate change and its adverse effects in proportion to their share of 
cumulative global greenhouse gas emissions’ (Page 2013: 237).  
Unfortunately, this principle is not as straightforward when it comes to the practical 
implementation. As a ‘backward looking approach’ (Page 2013: 238) it requires us to 
clearly identify the (past) polluters, which raises some of the problems that we have 
already discussed. Even though we can overcome a few of the problems by sticking to 
the collectivist position, some difficulties remain, such as linking the causes of climate 
change directly to specific disadvantageous effects (Page 2013: 237). Moreover, due to 
the excusable ignorance problem, the PPP would only be unproblematically applicable 
from the 1980s on (Caney 2010a: 210–211). Beyond that, the PPP does not provide a 
solution for non-human causes of climate change that, even though nobody can be held 
responsible for them, have to be paid for by someone (Caney 2010a: 211). Finally, due 
to the fast growth of large emerging economies such as China and India, the PPP would 
eventually require them as well to pay considerable amounts for climate abatement, 
even though their per capita emissions are still low compared to industrialised 
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countries. This could seem unjust because it would perpetuate the poverty of many 
people in these countries. At the same time it would absolve wealthier countries such 
as the US or the members of the EU of some of their duties even though they would still 
be richer on a per capita basis and could afford to pay more without deteriorating into 
poverty (Caney 2010a: 212–213). 
The ability to pay principle 
In response to some of these problems, the justice literature has introduced the ‘ability to 
pay principle’ (APP). As a ‘forward-looking approach’ (Page 2013: 239; Caney 2010a: 213) 
the APP does not require to ascertain any past polluter and also does not face the 
problem of excusable ignorance or non-human causes of climate change. It rests on the 
belief that eventually someone has to pay for halting climate change no matter who is 
responsible, and that this someone should be the most advantaged, hence the 
developed countries, because they would not have to sacrifice any reasonable interests 
in order to do so (Caney 2010a: 214; Page 2013: 238). Again, the problems begin when 
we take a closer look at the APP. Some argue that it would ignore historic emissions 
and equally split the burden between all states above a to be defined threshold of wealth 
no matter how ‘dirty’ the past behaviour of these states has been (Page 2013: 239; 
Caney 2010a: 215). Even if one would circumvent this problem by distinguishing 
between ‘clean’ and ‘dirty’ developers and their share of the burden, one could still ask 
why the focus is solely on GHG emissions and not on a general distinction between ‘just’ 
and ‘unjust’ (colonialism, slave trade, etc.) pathways of development (Caney 2010a: 217). 
The beneficiary pays 
Besides the PPP and APP, the literature has also discussed to apply the ‘beneficiary pays 
principle’ (BPP) to the climate problem (Page 2013: 240). Its main advantage is that it 
avoids the problem of establishing a direct link between past polluters and present harmful 
effects of climate change, because it merely focuses on those who have benefited most from 
GHG causing activities. The BPP would require states to pay for climate change abatement 
proportional to the gains they have had from GHG causing activities such as burning fossil 
fuels etc. since 1750 (Page 2013: 240; Caney 2010a: 210). It is therefore in its outcome 
similar to the APP, however without ignoring past emissions entirely.  
However, it also does not come without any problems. Firstly, it entails a ‘chronological 
unfairness’ (Page 2013: 240) because it requires present beneficiaries of climate change 
to pay for its abatement while earlier generations that also benefited did not have to 
pay (Caney 2006: 473). Secondly, the BPP could become particularly problematic if 
applied to states that did benefit from GHGs in the past but have since deteriorated 
economically. Unlike the APP, which only targets wealthy states, the BPP would require 
the present generations within these poor states to sacrifice a considerable portion of 
their wealth for climate abatement and hence possibly throw people into poverty (Page 
2013: 240). Finally, it could prove difficult in practice to separate the part of the wealth 
of states that they have acquired due to climate change inducing activities such as 
burning fossil fuels from the part of their wealth that has come about due to other non-
emission related factors such as ingenuity or clever budgeting (Page 2013: 240). 
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The hybrid principle and climate justice in a non-ideal world 
Taking into account the discussed problems of the PPP, BPP and the APP, Caney has 
suggested to merge these into a ‘hybrid principle’ (Caney 2005, 2010a). This hybrid 
principle firstly consists of a ‘poverty sensitive polluter pays principle’, which means 
that persons or states would have to pay for climate abatement as long as this does not 
push them below a decent standard of living (Caney 2010a: 218). To tackle the 
remainder of problems and costs (non-human factors, excusable ignorance etc.), Caney 
proposes an adjusted APP, which he terms ‘history sensitive ability to pay principle’ 
(Caney 2010a: 218). According to this principle, the responsibility would fall on 
individuals or collectives that are able to pay but would distinguish between ‘just’ and 
‘unjust’ pathways to this wealth (Caney 2010a: 218).  
Despite the discussed problems, the principles discussed so far all can be defended as 
internally just from a theoretical or philosophical perspective. However, as pointed out 
above, the political and economic circumstances in which they would have to be 
implemented are far from ideal, which calls into question their practical feasibility. 
Thus, some scholars have focused on principles that would also be defendable from the 
perspective of non-ideal theory and stand a chance of actually functioning under non-
ideal circumstances (Heyward and Roser 2016). One particularly prominent example 
is Caney’s ‘integrationist’ approach (Caney 2016b: 14). Taking into account the 
multiplicity of political issues connected to climate abatement (e.g. poverty, food 
security, economic growth etc.), it gives specific guidelines what to do under the condition 
that ‘some fail to comply with their climate responsibilities’ (Caney 2016b: 12). Examples 
are a slight modification of mitigation targets, taking up extra responsibilities, 
imposing burdens on non-compliers, or changing the incentive structures to prevent 
future non-compliance (Caney 2016b: 13).  
Consequentialist critique and international paretianism 
Beyond that, the above-described principles have come under considerable criticism 
from scholars working in the consequentialist or teleological tradition. They have 
criticised them for being too abstract and detached from the political realities and 
instead have suggested principles that they deem to be more likely to be accepted. 
Moreover, they have argued that it might be specifically the close interrelatedness of 
current political negotiations with the above-discussed ideal typical principles of justice 
that stands in the way of an affective and politically feasible solution to the climate 
problem (Posner and Weisbach 2010; Sachs 2014).  
While there has been a multitude of suggestions, one of the most widely discussed 
consequentialist principles is ‘international paretianism’ introduced by Posner and 
Weisbach (Posner et al. 2008: 1570; Posner and Weisbach 2010: 93, 143). It rests on 
welfarist considerations and especially on the pareto optimum criterion, which entails 
that a specific distribution is more efficient than others if at least one person is better 
off while no one is worse off (Posner et al. 2008: 1565, 1570; Moellendorf 2015: 178; 
Frisch 2012: 225). The authors argue that most of the currently discussed climate 
treaties and especially principles linked to distributive and corrective justice do not 
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fulfil this criterion because redistribution between wealthy and poor could be reached 
better by different policies apart from climate policy (Posner et al. 2008: 1571; Posner 
and Weisbach 2010: 4, 73). Closely connected, they also maintain that a climate treaty 
would primarily benefit future generations that most likely will be wealthier than 
present generations anyway (Posner et al. 2008: 1571). Moreover, they claim that the 
most just principles are not politically feasible because it is not in the interest of wealthy 
countries to take decisive mitigation measures while developing countries are largely 
exempt from taking action (Posner and Weisbach 2010: 79–80; Posner et al. 2008: 
1568–1569). They question why big emitter states such as the US, that are not expected 
to suffer much from climate change, should agree to a climate treaty that would cause 
them great costs. At the same time, they challenge the assumption that developing 
countries should be excused because they are much more affected by climate change 
and hence will benefit greatly from such a treaty (Posner et al. 2008: 1569; Sachs 2014: 
208). They even argue that from this viewpoint the United States would have to receive 
side-payments to compensate them for agreeing to a treaty that does not directly 
benefit them (Posner et al. 2008: 1570).  
Posner et al. do have some valid points, at least from a purely economist perspective. 
For example the problem that eventually poor people in wealthy states could suffer 
somewhat from a climate treaty that imposes great costs on their country; or the fact 
that a climate treaty might not be the optimal way to redistribute wealth or correct past 
injustices (Posner et al. 2008: 1571). Moreover, dogmatic positions on specific forms of 
climate justice, i.e. the strict differentiation between developed and developing 
countries in the Kyoto protocol have in fact complicated the international negotiations 
considerably and scholars have begun to think of new and more effective ways of 
reaching climate justice (Deleuil 2012: 277). Finally, even though their specific 
principles seem debatable, to say the least (Sachs 2014; Frisch 2012), I think, just as 
the literature on non-ideal approaches to climate justice, they are right in pointing to 
the necessity to include the political level into the analysis of climate justice. Because 
in the end it is not the perfect abstract solution but the effective implementation that 
brings us forward in achieving actual global climate justice. 
Developing a new take on climate justice: introducing 
non-domination, impartiality, and mutual recognition  
As the discussions in the previous sections and the UNFCCC quote from the beginning 
of the paper exemplify, climate changes poses various, sometimes contradictory, justice 
problems. The literature has already come a long way in structuring these problems 
and in finding convincing answers in a philosophical and theoretical sense. However, 
relating these ideal typical ethical positions to the actual climate negotiations can be 
difficult. It can also be unsatisfying in terms of understanding the driving forces behind 
the political struggles on the ground and in actually overcoming existing global 
injustice. Focusing on abstract ethical positions to a certain extent obscures key 
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characteristics of the political realm that are central in preventing or enabling 
progressive and just climate policies. Examples are the multitude of actors involved, 
the unequal distribution of various forms of political power, the role of norms and 
international institutions, the influence of different identities, and the 
acknowledgement of the diversity of political contexts, in which climate policies have 
to be agreed upon and eventually implemented.  
The key problem is that much of the climate justice literature has not been chiefly 
developed from an IR perspective. A few scholars have begun to look at ‘non-ideal’ 
climate justice theory (Heyward and Roser 2016) and in some instances have come up 
with fairly concrete proposals to allocate responsibilities in the case of non-compliance 
or to reform political institutions (Caney 2016b). However, most of the climate justice 
literature does not primarily intend to aide an empirical analysis or to give concrete 
policy advice but rather constitutes a philosophical take on the issue (Zellentin 2015c: 
123). Beyond that, even those that have come up with more concrete advice concerning 
the political implementation, mostly come from a political theory or philosophy 
background and hence tend to neglect some of the existing literature and knowledge 
about international relations and its key dynamics. Thus, most of the justice principles 
developed here concern what climate justice ought to be on a substantive level or in 
other words emphasise first-order moral duties. In doing that they have partly neglected 
the practical or procedural dimension – or second-order duties – how this can be achieved 
politically (Zellentin 2015c: 129).  
Yet, as Erik Eriksen in a recent paper has convincingly argued, it might be more important 
to focus on amending the (unjust) rules of the game and institutional settings – that have 
brought about and perpetuate injustice – instead of only on particular unjust outcomes  
(Eriksen 2016: 2-3). Focusing on the root causes for global climate injustice that are 
ingrained in specific political structures and unequal distributions of power (Eriksen 
2016: 4) will be more rewarding in the long term than developing ever more detailed 
and theoretically just but eventually politically detached ideal types. This is not to 
suggest that the philosophical take on climate justice is unwarranted. Instead, I follow 
the calls of several scholars for a division of labour but also for a bridge building 
between philosophical/theoretical approaches of climate justice and works that focus 
on practical pathways to its political realisation (Zellentin 2015c: 133).  
A viable approach is therefore to look into literature that is closer related to the political 
dimension of global injustice and to extract key conceptions of justice from there that 
focus more on the practical and procedural level. In the following, I will thus focus on 
three widely discussed conceptions, which also form the basis of the GLOBUS research 
project, which critically engages with the EU as an actor concerning global (in)justice. 
In particular, the conceptions are non-domination (Pettit 2010; Bachvarova 2013; 
Shapiro 2012; Markell 2008), impartiality (Føllesdal 2000; Kane 1996) and mutual 
recognition (Eriksen 2016; Schmidt 2007; Anderson and Honneth 2005). These 
conceptions are more attuned to the political struggles and primarily concern the rules 
of the game and institutional settings that have created (and perpetuate) global 
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injustices in the first place. In the following, I explore how a re-reading of key climate 
justice problems through these three conceptions can lead to new insights and help us 
to make sense of the climate negotiations from a procedural and institutional justice 
point of view. 
Climate justice as non-domination 
Justice as non-domination 
I begin with the conception of non-domination (Eriksen 2016: 8–13), which is strongly 
connected to neo-republican theory and its understanding of freedom as freedom from 
domination (Pettit 2010: 140, 1997; Lovett 2009; Shapiro 2012; Bachvarova 2013). At the 
core of the conception stands the idea that states remain the key actors in the international 
realm and are central in causing but also in working against global injustices, despite a rising 
importance of non-governmental organisations, international institutions, and 
international law (Eriksen 2016: 11). However, not all states are equally powerful, be it in 
terms of economic, military, ‘soft’ or ‘normative power’ (Nye 2004; Diez 2005; Sjursen 
2006a, 2006b). In effect, this can lead to problematic constellations in the international 
system or international treaties not respecting the will and possibly the wellbeing of all 
states and their citizens in the same manner, leading to global injustice (Skinner 2010: 100).  
Finding ways to alleviate the influence of more powerful states i.e. preventing them 
from ignoring international agreements or dominating the outcome of the negotiations 
hence can contribute to more just solutions to global problems. In general, the 
conception of non-domination does not fundamentally challenge the existing system of 
states, but aims at improving it in order to ensure a fair system of global governance 
and to prevent that less powerful states are harmed by the action or inaction of others 
(Eriksen 2016: 11–12). On a practical level, this endeavour could take different forms. 
On the one hand, it could mean to build coalitions between less powerful states or 
between those that are particularly affected or even endangered by certain global 
problems. The aim would be to prevent harm and unfair decisions and to challenge the 
domination of powerful states. On the other hand, it could entail to support 
international norms such as sovereignty or non-intervention, which aim at protecting 
less powerful states from outside interference. Alternatively, and this partly contradicts 
the first two approaches and overlaps with impartiality, it could involve the 
strengthening of international institutions or rules of procedure that preserve the 
sovereign equality of all states when it comes to having a say in negotiations about 
global problems. 
While promoting non-domination thus can contribute to global justice by preventing 
(unfair) decisions to be taken without considering the interests of less powerful states, 
it has its shortcomings and can itself become problematic (see also Markell 2008; 
Eriksen 2016: 12). Thus, not all forms of domination are essentially bad from a 
normative perspective, and finding international solutions to pressing collective action 
problems can necessitate leadership by certain states or coalitions (Falkner 2007; 
Wurzel and Connelly 2011; Delbeke and Vis 2015). It could also entail to set up binding 
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international treaties that impose certain rules and behaviours onto all states – which 
ultimately also holds true for ensuring non-domination. Eventually, this limits the 
freedom of individual states and interferes with their sovereignty, hence partly running 
against the idea of non-domination. Beyond these concerns, focusing only on non-
domination might be not sufficient to achieve global justice, because it does not aim at 
fundamentally challenging the status quo (Cox 1981). It largely accepts the current 
system of states and merely aims at amending it, which neglects many injustices that 
are ingrained in this very system of states. 
Non-domination and climate justice 
How can the conception of non-domination enhance our understanding of climate 
justice problems and how can it help us to make sense of the political struggles on the 
ground? Looking at the previously discussed debates on climate justice, the conception 
of non-domination first becomes relevant concerning the question whether individuals 
or collectives should be held responsible for GHG emissions and abatement costs. 
Beyond scholarly preferences (Page 1999: 66, 2013: 232; Caney 2005: 758–759), in the 
actual climate negotiations this question has been largely settled towards a statist 
perspective. Thus, the two key justice dilemmas, distributional and intergenerational 
justice have been mainly discussed in relation to the actions and contributions of 
different states. Non-governmental organisations, corporations, activists and 
academics certainly have played a role in the domestic struggles that led to the national 
climate strategies and increasingly have been granted opportunities to directly 
participate in the COPs, e.g. at the various side-events or in the delegations of states 
(Corell and Betsill 2001). However, in the end states and their representatives have 
negotiated and agreed to the central climate treaties such as the UNFCCC, Kyoto and 
the Paris Agreement. Thus, bringing in the conception of non-domination in order to assess 
to which degree uneven distributions of power between state actors have played a role in 
these negotiations and led to injustices seems promising. Additionally, it can help us to 
identify concrete political strategies to overcome situations of unfair dominance and to 
envision alternative, more just principles to address central climate challenges. 
The unequal distribution of power between different states becomes immediately 
apparent with a look on questions of distributional climate justice. As I have discussed 
before, the responsibilities, vulnerabilities as well as capabilities to abate climate 
change are unevenly distributed between developed and developing states (Caney 
2005: 752, 2010a: 205; Shue 1993, 1999: 534; Gardiner 2004a: 579). The international 
treaties adopted so far acknowledge these imbalances to a certain extent and contain a 
few instruments to overcome this divide. These are either broad principles such as the 
CBDR in the UNFCCC, or market instruments such as the clean development 
mechanism (CDM) and the possibility for joint implementation (JI) in the Kyoto 
Protocol. Beyond that, the participants of the climate negotiations have agreed upon 
several financial instruments to support the most affected countries such as the Green 
Climate Fund, the Environmental Facility, and the Fast Start Financing scheme. 
However, none of these instruments goes far enough in terms of effectively abating 
climate change or fully compensating the most affected states for the resulting damage. 
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Moreover, besides the largely non-binding CBDR, neither of these options 
fundamentally challenges the underlying power imbalances so that in the end the 
outcomes of the climate negotiations largely reflect the (short-term) interests of 
powerful industrialised states.  
Especially the US have often prevented binding commitments for the biggest polluters 
or far reaching promises for compensation to the most affected states not least due to 
fears of losing ground economically vis-à-vis emerging economies (Harris 2000: 17, 
2002: 153; Kraft 2013: 112; Eckersley 2007: 315–319). We can thus identify a relatively 
clear case of domination, which so far has prevented more appropriate solutions or 
fundamental changes in the architecture of the climate negotiations. The most dramatic 
example of the failure to consider the interests of all states equally, no matter their size 
and influence, is the situation of the small island states. Despite overwhelming 
scientific evidence that they will cease to exist as sovereign states due to sea level rise 
in the not so far future (IPCC 2015: 67; Barnett and Campbell 2015; Zellentin 2015a), 
the existing climate treaties or national pledges so far have not even come close to 
implement measures that would prevent this from happening (Oels and von Lucke 
2015: 64). The same goes for certain geographical areas of many developing countries 
e.g. large low-lying coastal settlements in Bangladesh (IPCC 2015: 13; Nicholls and 
Cazenave 2010). In addition, even if they will not disappear altogether, almost all 
developing countries will face considerable hardships such as droughts, floods, the 
spread of diseases, and food insecurity (IPCC 2015: 15–16) if the big polluter states will 
not radically curb their emissions or redouble their financial and technological support 
of these countries in order to adapt to climate change.  
Problems of (unjustified) dominance of powerful state actors also play a role 
concerning concrete principles to the allocation of emission entitlements and costs for 
climate abatement. Thus, the idea of emission grandfathering that largely ignores past 
emissions clearly favours already powerful actors (Page 2013: 233). The same goes for 
the idea of international paretianism or in general many consequentialist principles 
that for the sake of political feasibility or economic efficiency argue for less progressive 
climate treaties or even for side-payments from the most vulnerable states to powerful 
actors such as the US (Posner et al. 2008: 1570). These approaches at least to some 
extent accept the status quo as given and hence reproduce unfair structures of 
dominance. In contrast, other principles addressing the allocation of emission 
entitlements have tried to overcome the imbalance between developed and developing 
countries. One concrete example is to focus on per capita emissions. Although focusing 
on individuals at its core, this principle would nevertheless calculate these emissions 
for whole states. Due to their comparatively large populations and moderate GHG 
outputs, this would give developing countries the chance to catch up economically vis-
à-vis the developed states, hence alleviating unequal distributions of power to a certain 
extent. The same goes for similar ideas that focus on the ‘right to (sustainable) 
development’ (Vanderheiden 2008: 64), an ‘antipoverty principle’ (Moellendorf 2015: 177), 
or the distinction between ‘subsistence’ and ‘luxury’ emissions (Shue 1993).  
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All these approaches in the literature either reinstate or challenge certain unequal 
relations of power and wealth and thus in one way or another can be assessed against 
the backdrop of non-domination. Unfortunately, the actual climate negotiations clearly 
mirror and perpetuate the uneven distribution of power between the developed and 
developing countries. Thus, even though the industrialised states have acknowledged 
their primary responsibility for past emissions (UN 1992: 2) – hence accepted some 
form of the PPP –the actual commitments agreed upon so far only to a very small extent 
implement the principles developed in the climate justice literature designed to 
overcome this imbalance (Okereke and Coventry 2016: 4).  
While the unequal distribution of power and forms of domination are most obvious 
between the developed and developing countries, this is only one layer of the problem. 
Especially in recent years, the quick economic growth and increase in GHG output as 
well as the growing political weight of several emerging economies most importantly 
China and India, has led to new inequalities (Okereke and Coventry 2016: 3). While 
quickly becoming major perpetrators in terms of GHG output, these countries have 
often opposed decisive climate action. Either dismissing restrictions to their emission 
budget and hence their economy as undue outside interference into their sovereignty 
or rejecting more progressive policies with reference to their status as developing 
countries and their moderate historical emissions (Paltsev et al. 2012; Christoff 2010). 
At the same time, powerful developed states or collective actors such as Germany or the 
EU have at least tried to consider the interest of the most vulnerable countries and for 
instance have initiated alliances with the small island states or pushed for international 
solutions that take into account the needs of the less powerful (Falkner 2007; Jänicke 2011). 
The climate justice literature has already taken up these shifts in power, but also in 
responsibility for climate change. Thus, beyond only looking at past emissions and 
capabilities, concepts such as the ability to pay principle try to take into account the 
changing political and economic landscapes and at least in the future would require 
China or India to pay for climate abatement as well (Caney 2010a: 220). Looking at 
these changing constellations through the lens of non-domination, can sharpen our 
understanding beyond the idea of distributive justice. It can help us to cut through the 
complicated political struggles and identify problematic instances of dominance as well 
as possible ways to overcome these. 
Apart from questions of distribution, non-domination can also contribute to our 
understanding of questions of intergenerational climate justice. Not mitigating climate 
change in the present hence could be understood as a form of unfairly harming, hence 
dominating future states or of reproducing the uneven distribution of power of the 
present international system because already poor states will probably only get poorer 
when hit by unmitigated climate change. At the same time however, some form of 
dominance or leadership in the present – for instance by the EU (Wurzel and Connelly 
2011; Schreurs and Tiberghien 2007) – might be necessary to reach a robust agreement 
to prevent this development. This in turn also means that the freedom of individual 
states will be curtailed to some extent. While this could be justified concerning already 
powerful and wealthy states, a progressive climate treaty that effectively bans most 
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GHG emissions could also considerably affect the economic development of developing 
countries, hence leading to problematic forms of domination. Thus, from the 
perspective of non-domination it would always have to be accompanied either by 
exceptions for currently less wealthy states or by substantive financial and 
technological support from industrialised countries for developing countries. 
Enhancing climate justice through non-domination? 
What would possible solutions to the climate problem look like from the perspective of 
non-domination? Anchoring the conception of non-domination more thoroughly in the 
climate negotiations might be able to overcome some of the existing injustices. It would 
mean to live up to the claims of the UNFCCC that no state must be negatively affected 
by the actions of others (UN 1992: 2) and to seriously consider the rights of all states 
and their sovereign equality no matter how big and powerful they are. In more detail, 
this would firstly mean to take the past responsibility of industrialised states seriously 
and to translate that into concrete emission reduction targets because a failure to do so 
would undermine the rights and sovereignty of the most affected countries. Thus, 
consequently implementing the PPP in combination with the ability to pay principle 
would go a long way in reducing unfair instances of domination because it would 
primarily require the biggest past polluters and currently wealthiest states to mitigate 
and pay. At the same time, it would spare developing countries for the time being, however 
not without containing a mechanism to integrate emerging economies in the future.  
Apart from specific instruments, taking non-domination seriously could necessitate 
changes in the political architecture to tackle climate change. Thus, it could entail 
increased coalition building efforts to contain the influence of powerful states. Most 
importantly, this would mean more South-South cooperation, i.e. more ‘coalitions of 
the weak’ (Narlikar and Tussie 2004), to prevent powerful states from dismissing the 
legitimate concerns of the Global South. To some extent, this has already happened 
when several developing countries aligned their positions in the international 
negotiations (Kasa et al. 2008) or when wealthier developing countries have begun to 
support the poorest ones. In addition, strengthening non-domination could also mean 
building coalitions of the more progressive actors to put pressure on the climate 
laggards. The climate negotiations already contain traces of this approach, for example 
the progressive the Cartagena Group, the Climate Vulnerable Forum (CVF) or the 
efforts of the EU to align with the small island states or other strongly affected countries 
against the US and China (Vogler and Bretherton 2006; Yamin 2010). Such coalitions 
could be instrumental in breaking up the divide between developed and developing 
countries, which from the beginning has complicated the climate negotiations. 
However, and largely in contrast to the aims of these coalitions of progressives, non-
domination could also mean to generally dismiss global top-down approaches to curb 
emissions such as the Kyoto Protocol. The latest Paris agreement can serve as an 
example for this strategy because it does not prescribe binding emission reductions 
targets but merely encourages the participants to develop their own nationally indented 
contributions over time.  
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Having said that, merely building coalitions could be too weak to actually prevent the 
continuing domination of various countries. Thus, if thought through to the end, non-
domination could also legitimate more far-reaching changes in the governance of 
climate change. This could for instance entail to not only hold yearly COPs but to 
establish binding rules of procedure for these conferences that compensate for the gaps 
in capabilities and influence between the states and ensure an equal say of all states. 
One possibility could be to restructure the decision-making processes similar to the UN 
general assembly. As a result, every state would have one vote, and decisions would be 
taken by simple or two thirds-majority vote, which eventually could favour the majority 
of currently less well-represented states. However, it also would have to go beyond that, 
because this mode of representation could easily lead to majority decisions – so to 
speak the Tocquevillian ‘tyranny of the majority’ (Tocqueville et al. 2006) – that neglect 
decisive climate action and hence will harm and dominate several countries. In order 
to recognise the right of all states to keep existing in their present form and not be 
harmed by environmental changes not under their control (hence be dominated 
indirectly by the actions of others), it would mean to approach the climate problem 
from the perspective of the most affected. Thus, one would have to implement 
procedures that ensure that even a majority of states or a coalition of more powerful 
ones could not block decisive climate action or at least that the most affected ones are 
automatically compensated for their losses.  
However, such mechanisms partly already fall under the heading of impartiality or 
mutual recognition. They would most likely create new problems of domination and 
interference in the sovereign decisions of individual states and hence be problematic 
itself from the perspective of non-domination. 
Problems of non-domination 
Having discussed the virtues of non-domination, it is debatable whether it should 
always be the only guiding principle of the climate negotiations. Forging an effective 
climate agreement goes against the (short term) interest of some states and their 
current governments. These states could simply ignore the climate negotiations and the 
resulting agreements on the grounds of non-interference into their sovereignty or could 
even build counter-coalitions to prevent progressive climate action – the election of 
Donald Trump might lead the US in such a direction. In fact, the UNFCCC directly 
emphasises the sovereign right of all states ‘to exploit their own resources pursuant to 
their own environmental and developmental policies’ (UN 1992: 2), although with the 
qualification that these actions ‘do not cause damage to the environment of other 
States’ (UN 1992: 2). Thus, the negotiations might need some states taking the lead or 
exercising some kind of coercion and hence dominating the debate to a certain extent 
at the expense of others to overcome the short-term interests of some (Cripps 2011). 
From this viewpoint, the leadership of the EU in the past (Falkner 2007: 522; Vogler 
and Bretherton 2006; van Schaik and Schunz 2012) constitutes a positive form of 
domination because it aims at forging a long-term solution to climate change that 
eventually prevents the domination and even extinction of less powerful actors. Beyond 
these concerns, non-domination alone fails to capture all relevant options for achieving 
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a just solution to climate change. Firstly, it obscures the legitimate interests and role of 
non-state actors. Secondly, it fails to capture the central importance of universal norms 
and international law in convincing states and citizens of the necessity of climate action.  
Climate justice as impartiality 
Justice as impartiality 
Conceptualising global justice in terms of impartiality (Kane 1996; Føllesdal 2000) 
goes back to Kant, natural law theorists and other proponents of a universal 
understanding of justice and rights (Eriksen 2016: 13–18; Kant and Reiss 1991) and 
necessarily starts out from some form of pre-existing theory of justice. It understands 
justice as a ‘context transcending principle’ (Eriksen 2016: 14) and emphasises the need 
for neutral, universalist principles and institutions that at least in principal, and based 
on certain prerequisites, can be considered just or fair from the perspective of all 
involved parties. It also extends the perspective of non-domination by not looking at 
states as the only relevant political actors but also including the rights and needs of 
individuals. Impartiality thus goes beyond the idea of amending the existing 
international system of states. Instead, it means to actively transform this system, to 
strengthen law-based orders to deter dominance and power inequalities as well as to 
eventually build a cosmopolitan community of individuals. In the long term, disputes 
in the international realm are to be decided by an impartial third party, which in 
practice entails to strengthen international institutions such as the UN, the ICC, 
cosmopolitan law and the rights of individuals. In effect, this also means to interfere in 
the sovereign decisions of states, which hence could clash with the principle of non-
domination. An extreme example would be the responsibility to protect (Bellamy 2010) 
and resulting humanitarian interventions (Holzgrefe and Keohane 2003) to recue 
oppressed people even against the will and military force of the state they live in. The 
conception of impartiality thus is a useful addition of non-domination and is able to 
address some of its shortcomings and blind spots. 
Having said that, impartiality as well comes with a range of problems. It cannot escape 
the situatedness and dependence on specific contexts of all claims of justice. What some 
would see as neutral and universal position, will certainly perceived as biased by others 
(Ashley 1988; Ashley and Walker 1990), as the various disputes about the extent and 
applicability of human rights exemplify (Donnelly 1999, 2007). Eventually, some will 
perceive the strengthening of international institutions, specific policies and 
cosmopolitan law as a form of domination and interference in their sovereignty. A 
seemingly impartial understanding of global justice that aims at curtailing the influence 
of states and strengthening neutral third party institutions will thus nonetheless always 
invoke strong opposition. In the current system of states, it hence seems rather 
unrealistic to establish such a system any time soon. Moreover, to be accepted by all or 
at least many, impartial norms would always have to be phrased in fairly general terms 
because the more specific they get, the more resistance they will invoke (Wiener 
2007a). Finally, strengthening a certain set of norms that allows to interfere in the 
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sovereignty of states runs the risk of being exploited for imperialistic or selfish reasons. 
Nevertheless, impartiality certainly is a useful extension of the principle of non-
domination and as the following paragraphs exemplify is key in forging an effective 
climate agreement. 
Impartiality and climate justice 
How can the conception of impartiality help us to re-read the climate justice literature? 
First of all, it reminds us of the relevance of an individual or non-state dimension of 
climate change and justice (Schroeder 2010; Schroeder and Lovell 2012). Even though 
several authors have shown why a collectivist position makes sense, and despite the fact 
that the international negotiations primarily focus on states, there exist considerable 
injustices on the individual level. Thus, notwithstanding the fact that it seems 
reasonable to hold states responsible for the cumulative emissions output, it is possible 
to focus on individuals when it comes to the harmful effects of climate change. The 
vulnerability towards the negative effects of climate change is often directly linked to 
the economic position and living conditions of individuals (Kelly and Adger 2000; 
Füssel and Klein 2006). Hence, the majority of scientists, activists and politicians 
rightfully claim that the poorest parts of the population will be hit first and hardest by 
climate change due to a heightened vulnerability and a lack of coping capacity (Eakin 
and Luers 2006; O'Brien et al. 2007; Parry et al. 2007). Thus, while the international 
solutions to climate change have to be negotiated and implemented at the state level, 
from an impartial justice perspective the needs and ‘human security’ (Barnett et al. 
2010) of individuals cannot be ignored. 
This becomes all the more important with a view on the vast differences in the wealth 
of individuals within countries. Thus, as natural disasters – i.e. at the same time socio-
political disasters – such as the 2005 hurricane Katrina in New Orleans have shown 
that even within the world’s wealthiest countries there are large parts of the population 
that lack the necessary coping capacity to deal with climate change and its effects 
(Giroux 2006; Masquelier 2006; U.S. Government 2006). At the same time, even the 
poorest developing countries contain elites that will be able to adapt to climate change 
without much effort. Consequently, a truly just solution to climate change cannot 
dismiss these individual differences.  
Moreover, cutting into the black box of the state through the lens of impartiality also 
enables us to see the domestic political struggles that often prevent states from agreeing 
to progressive international solutions (Harrison 2000; Harrison and Sundstrom 2010). 
It exposes the sometimes contradicting interests of different groups in the population, 
for instance coal workers or people living in low-lying coastal areas, which somehow 
have to be accounted for if one wants to implement an impartial solution. Furthermore, 
it reminds us of the role non-state actors play in the negotiations but also in terms of 
causing the problems and in implementing policies that have been agreed upon on the 
state level (Bulkeley and Schroeder 2012; Schroeder and Lovell 2012; Raustiala 2001). 
For instance, market-oriented approaches such as emission trading schemes or the 
CDM often apply beyond national borders and crucially depend on the participation of 
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corporations. In a similar vein, the concrete actions of individuals, their dietary choices, 
their means of transportation or their forms of housing play an important role in 
generating but also in overcoming excessive GHGs and global injustices (Paterson and 
Stripple 2010; Carlsson-Kanyama and Gonzalez 2009). Finally, an individualist 
perspective also brings to the fore the problem of GHG emissions that are not directly 
emitted in one country. Thus, even though a state such as Germany may have reduced 
its GHG output considerably since 1990 (Weidner and Mez 2008), the production of 
goods and services all over the world that are consumed in Germany produces 
emissions as well, which do not show up in their entirety in state based emission figures 
(Noleppa and WWF 2012).   
Beyond the focus on the role of the individual level, the conception of impartiality also 
can help us in assessing the dilemmas and principles developed in the climate justice 
literature. Firstly, it reinstates the crucial importance of scientific findings and even 
more importantly of scientific-political and multilateral institutions such as the IPCC 
that bring together scholars from all over the world to forge some kind of consensus or 
‘impartial’ position concerning the nature of climate change and the necessary political 
and technical steps to prevent or alleviate it (Oreskes 2004). Without such a consensus 
and appropriate institutions to forge and disseminate it, developing a shared impartial 
position on climate change would not be possible, which is why the climate justice 
literature heavily rests on the findings of climate science. Only by accepting the 
scientific consensus, i.e. some impartial point of reference, further debates about 
justice dilemmas or practical solutions become possibly in the first place.  
Secondly, focusing on impartiality largely decides the debates between consequentialist 
or teleological approaches and non-teleological or deontological approaches towards 
the latter. From an impartial perspective, finding a solution to the climate problem 
cannot be guided by questions of political feasibility or economic efficiency but has to 
build on more universal concerns such as preventing harm for present or future 
generations (Sachs 2014: 214). Thus, in addition to posing problems from the 
perspective of non-domination, popular consequentialist principles such as emission 
grandfathering as well as international paretianism largely are incompatible with an 
impartial solution to the climate problem. At the same time, an impartial standpoint 
cannot just aim at abating climate change not matter the consequences but would have 
to addresses both distributional and intergenerational justice. Harming either present 
people by imposing too strict mitigation commitments that curtail economic growth, 
or future generations by failing to prevent the worst climate scenarios would violate the 
criterion of an universally – hence also across generations – just approach. Due to its 
strong links to moral philosophy and ethics, naturally, most practical principles that 
the climate justice literature has come up with largely concur with the criterion of 
impartiality (Zellentin 2017). Enlisting first of all the biggest polluters to mitigate GHGs 
as well as to require the most wealthy ones to pay for the associated costs, which in 
combination amounts to the previously discussed ‘hybrid principle’ seems immediately 
justified from this perspective.  
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Unfortunately, the biggest problems do not lie in finding solutions that are just in the 
sense of impartiality in principle, but in implementing those principles under non-ideal 
circumstances (Caney 2016b). On a general level, most states accept the scientific 
consensus and most of what the climate justice literature has come up with. 
Consequently, they agree that the industrialised states are primarily responsible (PPP), 
that the wealthier states have to act first and support the poor (CBDR, APP, BPP), and 
that developing countries need to be given time to catch up but will have to contribute 
in the future (right to sustainable development, antipoverty principle, emissions 
egalitarianism). Yet, this support increasingly diminishes when it comes to actually 
translating those principles into concrete policies and implementing them on the 
national level. Thus, the international negotiations on climate change by their very 
nature have always entailed traces of impartiality and have emphasised the importance 
of international institutions and cosmopolitan law. The whole idea of agreeing on a 
global treaty to climate change rests on the belief that there does exist some form 
universal solution that can accommodate for the interests of all and hence be 
considered fair and justified by all.  
Nonetheless, the political solutions developed so far differ considerably concerning 
their strength and specific instruments and in general do not entirely fulfil the criterion 
of impartiality. In part, this is due to power inequalities and instances of domination. 
Hence, short-term interests of individual states and fears of interference into their 
sovereignty often stand in the way of long-term universal solutions. Yet, beyond that, 
an important reason is also the difficulty to specify general principles or norms without 
generating contestation (Wiener 2007a, 2007b). Accordingly, translating impartial 
solutions, agreed upon at the international level into a multitude of domestic contexts, 
bears a number of problems and creates new injustices.  
A look at the existing climate negotiations exemplifies some of these concerns. The 
UNFCCC, while including very general universal notions i.e. the emphasis on 
‘preventing dangerous interference in the climate system’ (UN 1992), leaves much 
room for individual interpretations of how to reach the overall goal, and thus is less 
dominating, very inclusive, but also less effective. The Kyoto Protocol on the other 
hand, focuses much more on the international level, top-down approaches and contains 
quite specific targets and measures to combat climate change, but also to compensate 
for different abilities of the participants. While that increases its degree of impartiality, 
it also prescribes specific solutions and thus interferes with the freedom of individual 
states and creates contestation. Its specificity and progressive nature, but also the 
(implicit) claim to be the only viable solution to the climate problem – hence the 
ambition for impartiality – has prevented several states from joining, while at the same 
time, even the Kyoto protocol is far away from a truly impartial solution. This is also 
true for the past efforts of the EU to exert leadership in the climate negotiations. While 
the EU itself has adopted quite progressive climate policies and hence has lead by 
example, it had considerable difficulties to convince others to follow suit. An important 
hindering factor was the specificity of the policies that the EU tried to promote and also 
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the at least implicit conviction that these where the most impartial or best ways to abate 
climate change (Kilian and Elgström 2010; Springer 2008; Falkner 2007).  
Finally, the latest Paris agreement seems to account for these problems to a certain 
extend. It balances both impartiality and non-dominance as it contains very 
progressive targets – e.g. the 1.5 degree goal, reaching carbon neutrality until the mid-
21st century – but at the same time does not come up with top down measures, but 
leaves it up to the participants how to reach these goals (Dröge 2016; UN 2015). 
Enhancing climate justice through impartiality? 
What would a truly impartial solution to the climate problem look like? Focusing 
primarily on impartiality would mean to transform the international system much 
more fundamentally than non-domination would require. It would entail to radically 
develop the supranational, multilateral governance of climate change and to strengthen 
the decision-making and enforcement power of international institutions. 
Furthermore, a focus on impartiality would require us to strictly act on the premises of 
climate science and the recommendations of the IPCC and to implement measures that 
would ensure meeting the 2 or even 1.5 degree target. At the same time, it would mean 
to take into account the political and economic realities of less wealthy states and their 
populations and to find ways of supporting them to reach the ambitious climate targets, 
or to fully compensate them for their losses. In practice, this would require to set up a 
UN Climate Organisation with the power to enforce decisive emission reductions by the 
biggest polluters – for instance by imposing economic sanctions or by issuing 
substantial fines – and with considerable funds to provide financial and technological 
support for less wealthy countries. At the same time, one would have to ensure that this 
organisation is governed by fair rules of procedure that take into account the voices and 
legitimate concerns of all states, but also of the most affected individuals. This could 
also entail to strengthen the rights of individuals on the international level and their 
opportunities for judicial review if they think they are harmed by the effects of climate 
change or to strengthen the rights for so-called climate refugees. 
Problems of impartiality 
While all this seems to be quite agreeable on first sight, radical impartiality also comes 
with a range of serious problems (Eriksen 2016: 17–18). First of all, despite the 
overwhelming scientific consensus that climate change exists, there always remains 
some uncertainty regarding its exact effects and magnitude. This becomes even more 
problematic when it comes to specific approaches how to abate climate change, hence 
seriously diminishing the impartiality of these findings (Castles and Henderson 2003; 
Goodess et al. 2007). For example, whether top down regulations and binding 
mitigation commitments or bottom up market measures are more just cannot be 
decided in an entirely neutral way. Thus, a truly impartial solution concerning concrete 
measures is even in principle difficult to envision. This becomes even more problematic 
with a view on the existing institutions such as the IPCC or the sketched out idea of a 
UN Climate Organisation. These can never be entirely impartial institutions as they are 
the result of political struggles that entail power inequalities and diverging interests 
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that necessitate a form of compromise (Jobst 2010). Impartiality, however, in principle 
is at odds with such a compromise, because it presupposes the existence of an ideal 
typical solution that is just in its own right independently from political struggles or the 
procedures of its development. Moreover, creating a powerful, centralised climate 
organisation immediately raises concerns about its democratic accountability as well 
as concerning the danger of imperialist or interventionist ambitions. Finally, given the 
experience from other policy fields and from the existing climate negotiations, it seems 
highly unlikely that states would agree to establish such a powerful third party (Barrett 
and Stavins 2003).  
Thus, seemingly impartial international top-down approaches to climate change will 
always be perceived by some as inherently biased by the interests of specific states or 
interest groups. In addition, even though accepted on a general level, the specific 
measures to implement climate protection will always be contested. This raises serious 
concerns about the political feasibility of an exclusively impartial approach to climate 
justice, which, cannot be ignored entirely. A solution could lie in acknowledging the 
multiplicity of viewpoints of a range of actors and the need to take into account the 
specific contexts in which climate measures have to be implemented, which brings us 
to the third conception of justice, namely mutual recognition. 
Climate justice as mutual recognition 
Justice as mutual recognition 
The conception of mutual recognition (Eriksen 2016: 18-22; Schmidt 2007; Anderson 
and Honneth 2005, 2005) directly ties in with one of the core problems of impartiality, 
namely that apparently universal norms can become problematic when transferred to 
different contexts. Moreover, it acknowledges the problems that come with the Western 
or European bias in much of the literature underlying impartiality in particular and 
moral philosophy in general (Hobson 2012). From this perspective, justice is thus not 
a universal or neutral value that applies to all and in every context in the same manner 
but an inter-subjective category (Eriksen 2016: 20). In practice, this means that what 
is just is not decided prior to the political struggles but directly in processes of 
deliberation among all affected parties (Eriksen 2016: 19; Young 2011). The focus is on 
creating legitimate rules of procedure that in the end increase the legitimacy of the 
resulting decisions. It means that the decision making procedures have to be shaped in 
such a manner that they take into account the multitude of different identities (be it 
individuals, groups or states) and ensure that all voices are heard and recognised by 
each other. The aim hence would be to develop participatory processes and institutions 
in which justice claims can be discussed with an eye on the specific contexts in which 
they will be applied and eventually to create a sense of ownership among all involved 
parties. A good example for this understanding of justice is the practice of ‘participatory 
development’ that has become more and more common in the development aid sector 
since the 1980s. The core aim is to not impose certain ‘perfect’ solutions from the 
outside onto people, but to include all relevant stakeholders in the very development of 
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the solution and hence to make it more legitimate and enduring for the people that 
eventually have to live with it (BMZ 2002; Mohan and Stokke 2000). 
While certainly advancing our understanding of global justice, mutual recognition as 
well has its shortcomings. Thus, it is unclear where we should draw the line between 
hearing all voices and actually integrating their concerns in the resulting decisions. 
Recognising and including the standpoints of all involved parties could very well lead 
to much less demanding conceptions of justice that eventually only represent the least 
progressive common denominator. Moreover, focusing on including all parties into the 
process may underestimate the influence of existing power inequalities and the need 
for strong institutions to deter domination (Eriksen 2016: 22). Beyond that, the 
conceptions raises questions as to who decides about which collective identities and 
standpoints are legitimate and have to be included in the deliberative process. An 
unreflect understanding of the conception thus may neglect that actors will try to take 
advantage of the negotiating process and misuse it as gaining dominance over certain 
issues or blocking decisions altogether. Finally, it is questionable how one can clearly 
assess that an outcome of such deliberative process is truly just without reference to 
any kind of impartial criteria. In other words, would every outcome of such negotiation 
processes be just, even if it fundamentally neglects the (long-term) interests of some 
actors or those of future generations?  
Mutual recognition and climate justice 
What new insights can the conception of mutual recognition generate concerning 
climate justice? Firstly, the conception is somewhat flexible when it comes to the level 
of analysis i.e. the legitimate actors involved in the process, as it would in principle 
apply to states, groups or individuals as long as they are affected by climate change or 
by the decision how to handle the phenomenon. In this vein, it can sharpen our sense 
for actors that from the perspective of non-dominance or impartiality fall through the 
cracks. Examples are indigenous groups that are neither states nor individuals but 
nevertheless are affected by climate change and have a specific standpoint about the 
issue (Tsosie 2007; Schroeder 2010); but also corporations that play an important role 
in driving climate change in the first place, but potentially also in contributing to its 
abatement (Kolk and Pinkse 2007; Dunn 2002). From the perspective of mutual 
recognition, one would have to find better ways in the climate negotiations to integrate 
the positions of all affected societal groups, which eventually would also improve the 
legitimacy and possibly the prospects for implementation of the adopted measures.  
Beyond these thoughts on actors, mutual recognition can also help us to see the 
discussed climate justice dilemmas in a different light. Let us begin with the conflict of 
interest between distributional justice in the present, especially in terms of having the 
freedom to expand the economy to overcome poverty, and intergenerational justice, 
which eventually entails to adopt binding emissions reduction commitments that could 
curtail economic growth. From the perspective of mutual recognition, we cannot ignore 
either of them because both concern legitimate interests of present or future actors, 
which are seriously affected by the resulting decisions. In practice, the conception of 
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common but differentiated responsibility (CBDR) together with the pledge to ‘prevent 
dangerous interference with the climate system’ (UN 1992), which both have been 
enshrined in the climate negotiations since the adoption of the UNFCCC can be 
understood as a form of mutual recognition (but also of non-domination). Together 
these principles try to consider the legitimate interests of all affected parties in the 
present i.e. economic prosperity or overcoming poverty, without jeopardising the 
interests of future generations. The devil, however, is in the details and in the specific 
implementation of these abstract principles; because so far the unequal levels of power 
have prevented that all interests are recognised beyond a mere lip service. Thus, even 
though the CBDR reflects the interests of many developing nations to not having to 
reduce emissions for the time being, industrialised states so far have failed to cut their 
GHG output in an appropriate manner or to provide sufficient support for the most 
affected countries to adapt to climate change. This raises at least two problems.  
Firstly, due to the fact that climate change is not abated effectively, the adopted 
solutions so far clearly do not reflect the interest of all affected parties. For instance, 
they neglect the interests of the small islands states, which will almost certainly 
disappear due to sea level rise (Zellentin 2015a) and also fail to take into account the 
viewpoint none-state actors such as indigenous groups (Tsosie 2007; Schroeder 2010). 
Their characteristic ways of settlement and culture, hence their very survival as a 
distinct group may be particularly at risk due to climate change because they live in 
especially fragile environments such as the arctic circle or coastal wetlands (Tsosie 
2007; Zellentin 2015a). While the small island states largely were unsuccessful to 
enforce their demands due to a lack of power, indigenous groups face even greater 
challenges due to the general lack of agency in the current architecture of the climate 
negotiations that primarily focuses on states. Thus, these examples show that even 
though the international negotiations have found measures that address some of the 
key problems on an abstract level, the crucial part is their concrete implementation. 
Climate justice hence cannot end with finding such principles on an abstract theoretical 
level or agreeing to them in international treaties but has to address the domestic and 
local level as well.  
Secondly, looking at the existing negotiations through the lens of mutual recognition 
highlights the structural problem that it is difficult to recognise the interests of future 
generations. Short of a time machine, they have even less opportunities to voice their 
concerns than non-state actors, yet somehow would have to be included in the 
negotiations if we were to take the conception of mutual recognition seriously. One 
would expect that improving the decision making procedures and making them more 
inclusive and participatory would facilitate the voicing of concerns for future 
generation. However, while mutual recognition reminds us of this problem, it cannot 
alone provide a solution and probably can only become effective in a combination with 
impartial goals derived from climate science or moral philosophy.  
How does the conception of mutual recognition relate to the principles discussed in the 
climate justice literature? Looking at the battles over teleological versus deontological 
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principles, the assessment is less clear than from the perspectives of non-domination 
or impartiality. Because justice is not understood as a universal value, detached from 
the deliberations around it but as an intersubjective category, it really depends on the 
positions of the actors involved in the negotiations and on the specific form of such 
debates. Thus, if a fair and inclusive process of deliberation concludes that climate 
justice is better served through politically feasible and cost-efficient measures, this can 
very well be seen as the most just approach, despite the fact that this may be 
problematic from an impartial perspective. The problem however, lies in the fact that 
it is difficult to ascertain whether the process that eventually led to this outcome was 
truly inclusive and free from any form of domination that could have biased the adopted 
solutions. Additionally, as elaborated above, without any reference to impartial values 
or sophisticated procedural rules that insure that the interests of future generations are 
included in the process, the resulting solution could overly reflect the short-term 
interests of present generation and thus lack a progressive element.  
Having said that, the conception of mutual recognition is very helpful in critically 
assessing the utility of ideal typical climate justice conceptions – similar to what 
scholars in the non-ideal theory tradition have done. While conceptions such as the 
PPP, APP and the hybrid principle can be very convincing when discussed at a 
theoretical level, their actual implementation will always be contested. Thus, it seems 
immediately justified that the biggest past polluters would have to bear most of the 
costs and that the wealthier countries would have to substantively support the less 
wealthy and most vulnerable countries. However, translating this into concrete 
political arrangements and somehow coercing states to abide to these principles will be 
difficult (Caney 2016b). Additionally, even these principles are not entirely impartial 
and thus far from a perfect solution. Given these problems, it might be more 
appropriate to focus on establishing fair and inclusive procedures and to change the 
underlying political structures (Caney 2016b: 22) without ex ante prescribing ideal 
solutions. Politically this could be more promising because it does not scare away 
participants by insisting on too demanding principles of justice and also can establish 
a sense of ownership for the resulting agreements because all parties were involved in 
their creation. This could also contribute to overcoming the increasing scepticism 
towards allegedly ideal solutions developed by expert communities that are claimed to 
be without alternatives and that have been particularly influential concerning climate 
governance (Bäckstrand and Lövbrand 2016; Kennedy 2005). The IPCC has had 
problems in the past with such allegations and also has been accused of not being a 
neutral institution due to an overrepresentation of western scientists (Der Spiegel 
2010; Watts 2010). Focusing on improving the processes of deliberation, would 
reinstate the political, hence would re-politicise the debates and thus improve their 
democratic legitimacy.  
The existing climate negotiations can serve as an example for these considerations. The 
Kyoto protocol leans heavily towards an impartial principle and includes fairly specific 
and demanding top down forms of regulation. This has led to considerable opposition 
during the negotiation process, and eventually resulted in the withdrawal of several 
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parties, which seriously diminished the actual impact of the protocol (Eckersley 2007; 
Gardiner 2004b). In a similar vein, the 2009 COP in Copenhagen was one of the biggest 
failures of the climate negotiations not least because several European countries went 
into the negotiations with quite elaborated, and seemingly superior ideas how the end 
result should look like that basically resembled the Kyoto protocol. In combination with 
a sometimes problematic and non-transparent way of conducting the negotiations and 
the resistance of powerful actors such as the US and the BASIC countries, this led to 
the disappointing and non-binding Copenhagen Accords (Christoff 2010; Falkner et al. 
2010; Dimitrov 2010; Kilian and Elgström 2010). In stark contrast, the following 
negotiations that eventually led to the latest Paris Agreement as well as the agreement 
itself followed a different path. They were less determined to come to a specific form of 
agreement or perfect solution and instead focused more on an inclusive process and 
eventually on an agreement that although having great ambitious recognises the need 
for a multitude of different approaches by different actors to eventually reach this goal 
(Okereke and Coventry 2016; Dröge 2016). The result is a much more bottom up 
approach that seems less demanding and progressive – and certainly is so from an 
impartial perspective – but eventually could still yield better and even more just results 
(Ahrens 2017). 
Enhancing climate justice through mutual recognition? 
Thus, having in mind the previous discussion, in order to push climate justice towards 
the pole of mutual recognition, the focus does not lie on a specific form of result, but on 
shaping the process and on making sure that the conditions that lead to the result are 
as inclusive and fair as possible. In practice, the ideal typical principles partly overlap 
with what the other conceptions of justice would require. One would have to reform the 
decision making process within the COPs to make sure that all affected parties are 
represented and able to voice their concerns be it states, individuals or other groups 
(Nasiritousi et al. 2016; Araya 2015). Moreover, taking mutual recognition seriously 
would require to make sure that the decisions take into account the diverse contexts in 
which they would have to be implemented. Thus, they would have to entail a certain 
amount of indeterminacy under which different forms of implementation can be 
subsumed. The CBDR but especially the Paris Agreement with its bottom up focused 
INDCs can be understood as an important step in this direction. Moreover, in the 
political negotiations preceding the actual COP in Paris, important actors such as the 
EU displayed several behaviours and negotiating strategies more in line with mutual 
recognition. Thus, the EU had restarted its Green Diplomacy Network in 2009 and 
hence was much more inclined to listen to what third countries had to say about climate 
governance instead of trying to impose an ideal typical EU position (Ahrens 2017; Davis 
Cross 2017).  
Beyond that, incorporating mutual recognition more strongly into the climate regime 
would necessitate the creation of much more elaborated rules of procedure with a 
particular emphasis on creating an institutional space for various groups of non-state 
and indigenous actors. In general, mechanisms for political and institutional learning 
would have to be further developed to not only listen to all voices but to actual 
Franziskus von Lucke 
GLOBUS Research Paper 1/2017 
 
34 
implement diverse concerns and approaches. All this would not only have to take place 
within the international negotiations and concerning the global climate regime but also 
on a bilateral or regional basis. In sum, all these measures could help to increase the 
legitimacy of the adopted solutions and hence also their chances of actually being 
implemented on a broader scale. 
Problems of mutual recognition 
Having sad that, approaching climate justice from the perspective of mutual 
recognition only could create serious problems. It will certainly not be possible to create 
an ideal typical Habermasian arena of domination-free or non-authoritative discourse 
and hence the results of these deliberations will always have to be taken with a pinch of 
salt concerning their representativeness. Here, the conception of non-domination and 
the focus on power inequalities would also have to play an important role. Moreover, 
without any impartial criteria, integrating the legitimate concerns of future generations 
will be difficult, which runs the risk that the adopted measures will not be very 
progressive. While this would not be a problem from the perspective of mutual 
recognition alone, a holistic take on global justice cannot ignore this problem. In the 
same vein, a focus on recognising the concerns of all parties in an equal manner, 
certainly undermines the scientific consensus, which at least comes close to an 
impartial solution. This could empower climate sceptics or actors that want to sabotage 
the negotiations due to short term interests. The US debates about climate change are 
an interesting example in this respect. Due to an overly strong focus on including all 
positions into the debate, and a journalistic ethos for ‘balanced’ reporting, minority 
climate sceptical positions, often backed up by powerful fossil fuel companies, have 
often received a similar amount of attention as the positions based on the mainstream 
scientific consensus. This has eventually led to a problematic polarisation of the 
political debate that has undermined fact-based debates and prevented progressive 
climate policies from being adopted at the federal level (Eshelman 2014; Pazzanese 
2016; McCright and Dunlap 2011). 
Conclusion 
In the first section of this paper, I have discussed the existing literature on climate 
justice and extracted the main justice dilemmas and questions. While the literature 
certainly has come a long way in structuring the main dilemmas and developing specific 
principles to cope with climate change, it has mostly done so on an abstract 
philosophical level. Thus, it has been mainly concerned with what climate justice ideally 
should be. While this is not a problem in itself and certainly an indispensable first step, 
it does not really gives us a guidance to assess the political debates about climate 
change. Thus, what this literature – apart from notable exceptions in the non-ideal 
theory tradition (Caney 2016b; Gajevic Sayegh 2016; Heyward and Roser 2016) – has 
largely neglected, is how climate justice could be achieved politically, how the rules of 
the political game would have to be changed to provide a fair playing field for global 
climate justice. To overcome this blind spot and to contribute to building bridges 
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between political theory/philosophy and IR concerning climate justice, I have 
introduced three conceptions of justice – non-domination, impartiality and mutual 
recognition –, which are more closely concerned with the political struggles and 
questions of procedural justice. The aim was to provide a re-reading of the climate 
justice literature and of key political decisions through the lens of these conceptions in 
order to focus more on the question how one can achieve climate justice politically.  
As this discussion has shown, such a change of perspective can generate interesting 
insights and provides some food for thought for alternative political pathways. 
Introducing the non-domination, impartiality and mutual recognition has emphasised 
how we have to consider different categories of actors but also different levels of 
referent objects when it comes to politically achieving climate justice. It has highlighted 
how the uneven distribution of political power is still one of the main hindrances to just 
agreements on climate change, but also that seemingly impartial solutions that try to 
impose a specific understanding of climate justice come with their own set of problems. 
Moreover, looking at climate justice debates through the lens of mutual recognition 
refocuses the attention towards the procedural character of climate justice and reveals 
possible pathways to improving the quality of the deliberations. Finally, the discussion 
has also shown that none of these three conceptions of justice alone can provide a 
convincing understanding of climate justice, but that only their combination can bring 
us forward in sketching out feasible pathways to just political arrangements. Beyond 
that, including these three conceptions of justice can be helpful in linking the abstract 
climate justice positions to the actual political struggles and to better understand the 
problems that arise with the concrete implementation of abstract principles. Most 
importantly, bringing in the conceptions of non-domination, impartiality and mutual 
recognition re-instates the central importance of the political nature of the 
international negotiations on climate change. It reminds us that discussions about 
climate justice cannot be conducted without also thinking about the political factors 
that may constrain or enable specific solutions and thus re-politicises the discussion on 
climate justice to a certain extent.  
While I could only present some tentative insights in this paper, I hope that this can 
contribute to sparking a fruitful research agenda on climate justice that does not 
primarily focus on the theoretical or philosophical level but on the actual political 
struggles, which in the end will be crucial in finding just solutions to the climate 
problem. 
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